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Special Section

Encryption and Incrimination:
The Evolving Status of Encrypted Drives
Bulletin of the Association for Information Science and Technology – December/January 2014 – Volume 40, Number 2

by Shannon M. Oltmann

Information Policy
EDITOR’S SUMMARY
Individuals use encryption to safeguard many valid and legal applications but also to hide
illegal activity. Several legal cases have drawn the limits of self-incrimination under the
Fifth Amendment regarding providing passwords to access illegal information content,
such as child pornography. The cases illustrate that certain knowledge of evidence
amounts to a compelling need for access and that a subpoena for hard drive contents is
more likely to succeed than requiring a witness to provide a password. Since known
documents are not legally protected and biometric data can be compelled as evidence,
there is no reason that known digital documents, biometric passwords, and by extension,
alphanumeric passwords should not be compelled. Considering precedent and legal
doctrine, individuals should resist giving law enforcement any passwords and be wary of
sharing them. The question of encryption in criminal cases is under scrutiny and warrants
citizens’ concern.
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ncrypted computer files and drives are becoming increasingly
commonplace, with multiple free or inexpensive applications
allowing individuals with divergent technical skills to encrypt files
with ease. From a legal standpoint, “...both the promise and peril of
encryption arise from its very effectiveness – properly implemented, a
strong encryption regime provides near absolute security” [1, p. 599].
There are many reasons one might have encrypted files or an encrypted
drive. Encryption is routinely used to secure RFID tags and transmission of
payment information and medical records. Although there are numerous
institutional uses of encryption, this article focuses more on individual use.
There are also many resources for learning more about encryption. See, for
example, [2], [3], [4].
In individual use, one could be protecting private information (such as
legal records, financial information or passwords), intellectual property
(trade secrets, patents and inventions), legally protected information (records
protected by the Health Insurance Affordability and Accountability Act –
HIPAA – or the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act – FERPA) or
confidential information (sensitive academic research, media informants).
One may also encrypt data out of an abundance of caution or privacy. Of
course, people often encrypt data that would be probative of illegal activity
(including child pornography, fraud, pirated media and extortion).
This latter use remains a relatively untested area legally. In the past
decade, only a handful of cases have addressed the convoluted issues of
encrypted data and self-incrimination, with differing outcomes, as
illustrated here:
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United States v. Pearson (2006): Pearson faced multiple charges related to
child pornography. While out on bail, he re-acquired the images in question
and then encrypted those files. The FBI subpoenaed Pearson’s passwords,
but he refused to incriminate himself. (Note: Both legal analysis and
criminal courts have been unclear in their use of password, which has been
used frequently as a synonym for decryption key. This article follows this
practice.) The case was further complicated because the hardware belonged
to Pearson’s father, an attorney, who belatedly claimed attorney-client
privilege. Eventually, Pearson pled guilty to some of the charges.
In re Boucher (2009): Boucher entered the United States from Canada. A
border agent examined Boucher’s computer and found child pornography
after Boucher supplied the password. The agent then shut down the
computer and arrested Boucher. Shutting down the computer triggered the
encryption again, and prosecutors could no longer see or find the illegal
images. Boucher was ordered by the courts to supply the password, but he
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. The courts subsequently ruled he
had to supply a decrypted copy of the drive’s contents.
United States v. Kirschner (2010): Kirschner was indicted for child
pornography charges, and the government subpoenaed his encryption key to
gain further evidence from his encrypted drive. In this case, the judge
determined that requiring a defendant to supply his password would violate
his right against self-incrimination.
Commonwealth v. Hurst (2011): Hurst was charged with offenses related to
inappropriate sexual relations with a minor. Police suspected incriminating
evidence was on Hurst’s cellphone, but he refused to supply the password.
Before this case reached the court system, Hurst’s wife supplied the
password, and Hurst himself pled guilty.
United States v. Doe (2012): Doe was charged with child pornography. He
refused to supply his decryption key and was found in contempt of court,
then jailed. A judge then ruled that supplying his decryption key would be
tantamount to self-incrimination, so Doe did not have to supply it.
United States v. Fricosu (2012): Fricosu was indicted for mortgage and real
estate fraud. She refused to surrender the password (at one point saying she

forgot the password) to encrypted files that, the government believed, would
incriminate her. The court ordered her to supply a decrypted version of the
hard drive, rather than her password. Subsequently, a co-defendant supplied
the needed passwords.

Summary of Protections Against Self-Incrimination
At first glance, these cases do not provide consistent precedent.
However, there are a few factors that were important in nearly all of these
cases. To better understand these rulings, we need to review certain legal
concepts and doctrines.
The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment states that an individual
shall not “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.” To claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment, a defendant
“must demonstrate that (1) he has been compelled (2) to produce testimony
(3) that is incriminating” [5, p. 1125]. This statement neatly summarizes the
complex, evolving legal doctrines surrounding self-incrimination.
According to the first point, a defendant cannot be compelled to create new
documents, but if the documents or information that the government seeks
already exist, then requiring a defendant to produce them is generally not
considered incriminating (though there are exceptions to this rationale; see
[6], [1]). In each of the aforementioned cases, the information in question
was already present and had been voluntarily created, “which rendered their
content exempt from Fifth Amendment protection; thus, the entire analysis
in each opinion considered whether the act of production would invoke the
[self-incrimination] privilege” [1] (emphasis added).
For the purposes of this legal doctrine, “testimonial evidence” is
explained as “a communication of information from the [defendant’s]
memory or knowledge” [7]. Providing a key to a locked box or blood for a
DNA test are thus not considered self-incriminating “testimony” and can be
forced. Finally, incriminating simply means that the compelled testimony is
likely to support conviction.
In addition, “the government must prove the existence and location of
the subpoenaed documents and possess independent evidence, other than
compliance with the court order, for authenticating them” [1, p. 581]. In
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other words, law enforcement cannot simply go on a fishing expedition,
hoping to turn up data that will be evidentiary [8]. They must be able to
demonstrate the existence and likely location of specific documents.

Analysis of Recent Cases
From this summary of relevant legal doctrine, we can tease apart some
of the differences and contradictions in the preceding cases. Law
enforcement saw evidence of criminal wrongdoing in the Pearson, Boucher,
Hurst and Fricosu cases. Both Pearson and Boucher voluntarily agreed to let
law enforcement search their computers; during those searches, the officers
saw evidence. It was only after the initial search that the question of
encryption became relevant. In these cases, because the defendants had
“permitted investigators to see at least some” of the evidence, this “sufficed
to render the existence of all the illegal files a ‘foregone conclusion’” rather
than testimonial evidence [8, p. 544]. Hurst had sent inappropriate messages
to a minor, which were visible on the minor’s phone. While the police sought
confirmation of the transmission by searching Hurst’s phone, they had
sufficient evidence without that step. In the Fricosu case, police had recorded
conversations between the defendant and her husband (a co-defendant) that
revealed the existence and content of the sought-after documents.
In contrast, law enforcement in the Kirschner and Doe cases did not have
prior evidence that illegal content was on their computers. In these cases,
officers had suspicion of wrongdoing and were relying on the revelation of
decryption keys to investigate and uncover evidence. The court in Kirschner
determined that sharing the key “would be testimonial because it would
demonstrate knowledge of the password and access to the underlying
computer files …providing the password would reveal the contents of an
arrestee’s mind by recalling the password” [5, pp. 1171-1172], [6]. Simply
put, because the password was not written down (or already known to law
enforcement) in Kirschner and Doe, and it existed only in their minds,
compelling a defendant to reveal it would be self-incriminating testimony.
A final difference among some of the cases lies in the subpoenaed
request: in some cases, law enforcement wanted the defendant to provide an
unencrypted copy of the hard drive, while in other cases they asked for the

defendant’s password,
If law enforcement can describe the
which would then be used
existence and location of evidence,
to decrypt the data [6]. In
they have a stronger case for requiring
Pearson and Hurst, officials
access; however, if they cannot
wanted the passwords but
had sufficient evidence to
demonstrate prior knowledge of the
convict without it. Boucher
likely data, separate from a compelled
was first ordered to give his
revelation from a defendant, then law
password, then to supply a
decrypted version of the
enforcement has a weaker position.
drive. Fricosu and Hurst
were likewise first ordered to supply passwords, but law enforcement
received assistance from their spouses in deciphering the passwords, so
defendant cooperation was not necessary. In both Kirschner and Doe,
officials were requesting the password, and the subpoena was quashed due
to Fifth Amendment protections.
Some tentative conclusions can be drawn based on these cases. One of
the most important elements is whether the existence of evidence is a
“foregone conclusion,” as it was in Pearson and Boucher. If law
enforcement can describe the existence and location of evidence, they have
a stronger case for requiring access; however, if they cannot demonstrate
prior knowledge of the likely data, separate from a compelled revelation
from a defendant, then law enforcement has a weaker position. Second, it
appears that subpoenaing the contents of the computer drives, rather than
the key to decrypt them, is more likely to be successful. Recall that the
courts quashed the subpoenas for passwords from Kirschner and Doe, while
Boucher was ordered to surrender an unencrypted drive.

The Problem with Passwords
These cases, while relatively few, do seem to gradually build some points
of consensus. However, scholars are split about the wisdom of this consensus
and whether the cases so far are a solid foundation for legal precedent. In
particular, the two recent cases (Kirschner and Doe) that quashed subpoenas
for passwords are more problematic than they might at first appear.
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Protecting a password or
encryption key based on selfincrimination does not seem to be a
legally consistent argument and is
likely to be clarified and overturned
as these or similar cases work their
way up the court system.

Because courts can usually
compel defendants to produce
already-existing documents,
even if they are private, “it
makes little sense to deprive the
grand jury of relevant evidence,
after the encoding, merely
because the author has
transformed it into an even
more private form” [1, p. 604].
A defendant may be compelled to produce business documents, a diary or
pornographic images, even if those documents substantiate charges against
him, because the courts have held that the Fifth Amendment does not protect
already existing documents (unless the act of production itself would
constitute testimony). This doctrine holds even if the documents are, say,
sealed in an envelope or locked in a safe. Thus, it is counterintuitive for data
stored on a computer to enjoy additional protection merely because it is
protected by a password or hidden through encryption. Ungberg (2009)
notes that “sometimes a single password shields thousands of documents
that would otherwise be subject to government seizure with a simple search
warrant” [8, p. 554].
In addition, there is well-established precedent that biometric data
(whether it be fingerprints, DNA samples or saliva) can be compelled. It
seems illogical that a biometric password could be legally subpoenaed, but
an alphanumeric one could not [6]. Thus, protecting a password or
encryption key based on self-incrimination does not seem to be a legally
consistent argument and is likely to be clarified and overturned as these or
similar cases work their way up the court system.

Implications for Encryption Users
One lesson to be learned from these recent cases is to resist volunteering
one’s password or access to one’s computer. Both Pearson and Boucher
initially allowed law enforcement to examine their hard drives, which was a
key reason that courts subsequently determined they had no right to refuse

further examination. Indeed, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
offers advice if law enforcement seizes your computer: “…first off, don't
give them your password during the search – you have the right to remain
silent, so use it. Since they can't search your encrypted files without your
help, you've got leverage that most search targets never have” [9]. The next
step, according to EFF, should be calling a lawyer.
A second lesson is to be cautious when sharing passwords. Both Hurst and
Fricosu had their passwords revealed by their spouses. Hurst’s wife did not
want to protect him, and Fricosu’s husband was a co-defendant who likely
received a lighter sentence. However, either spouse could have been charged
with contempt of court for not revealing the passwords – and it would be
likely to happen to other close associates. Law enforcement may very well
use this as a threat to compel others to share their relevant information.
If the defendant chooses to not reveal the password, as in Doe’s case, he
is likely to be charged with contempt. For some defendants, contempt of
court is a preferable charge to the ones they are likely to face. Receiving
child pornography, for example, typically has a minimum sentence of five
years and requires registry on a sex offender list, which together make
contempt of court charges seem attractive. However, there are other cases in
which individuals may not want to reveal encryption keys and instead
choose contempt of court: journalists protecting sources, businesses
protecting trade secrets, intelligence operatives protecting strategic
information and so on.
Some scholars recognize that a contempt of court charge may not
persuade individuals to reveal their passwords or decrypt their hard drives.
In Pearson, the government tried suggesting that having a very large
encrypted drive was itself suspicious and indicative of illegal activity, but
this argument was rendered moot once Pearson cooperated [1]. Law-abiding
citizens who encrypt files – for whatever purpose – should take note. In a
separate yet related move, Larkin suggests that the government should be
able to use a “missing evidence instruction” when a defendant refuses to
decrypt. According to this approach, “the court may instruct the jury to
draw an inference that the missing evidence or testimony would have been
unfavorable” [6, p. 276l]. As Larkin notes, missing evidence instructions
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tend to strongly affect juries. While this instruction seems reasonable when
defendants are accused of child pornography, in other situations its
application is more problematic. Should a presumption of “unfavorable”
content be made in cases of journalists protecting sources or businesses
protecting trade secrets? Again, encryption can be used to protect both legal
and illegal files to safeguard legal, illegal or questionable activities. The
courts are still working out the appropriate approach to individuals who use
encryption to facilitate breaking the law; academic analysis and reflection is
still relatively sparse.
There has been even less work to-date considering legal users of

encryption and how they might fare in the criminal court system. With the
recent revelations about the depth and breadth of National Security Agency
(NSA) surveillance, increased caution and concern seem reasonable,
particularly since the NSA has stated that it keeps all intercepted, encrypted
communication until it can be decrypted and analyzed – which, by the very
nature of modern encryption, is an indefinitely long period of time [10]. For
decades, there has been a struggle between users who want to encrypt files
and the government which wants access to those files. The legal realm has
yet to reach a consensus on the appropriate way to facilitate government
access or to address government suspicions about legal and encrypted files. ■
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